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HEIDI LINDSEY, et aL V. DOW CORNING CORP., et aL:
THE EXCLUSION OF CLAIMANTS FROM
AUSTRALIA, ONTARIO AND QUEBEC
Stephanie Alexander
Abstract: In September 1994, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama approved a multi-billion dollar settlement in a global class action for
breast implant recipients. The court concluded its opinion by excluding women from
Australia, Ontario and Quebec from the settlement. After examining U.S. class action
procedural. requirements and analyzing the District Court's opinion, this Comment argues
that the court improperly applied the procedural requirements for a class action to the
detriment of the potentially injured women from Australia, Ontario and Quebe.
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 1, 1994, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama approved a $4.25 billion global settlement
agreement in a breast implant class action.' This settlement is the largest
products liability class action in United States history. 2 It includes women
from the United States, as well as claimants from sixty-five additional
countries.3
Foreign women criticized the settlement agreement as inequitable to
foreign claimants as compared with domestic claimants. 4 Only three per-
cent of the settlement was allocated to foreign class members. 5 Class
members from Australia and the Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec
voiced the strongest opposition to the settlement agreement.6 In response to
I In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation (MDL 926), Heidi Lindsey, et al. v.
Dow Coming Corp., et al., No. CV 94-P-I 1558-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Sept. I,
1994) [hereinafter Lindsey Opinion].
2 ld. at "3.
3 Id. at "6.
4 Id. at*6.
5 Id. at *11.
6 Id. at *6, * 14. One theory about the lack of strong opposition from other foreign claimants may
be that many of those countries were underrepresented in the settlement. Australia and Canada had
aggressive attorneys for the breast implant litigation. However, developing countries are less apt to have
effective advocates for their rights. Indication of the differing standards cerain manufacturers apparently
have applied when dealing with some of the developing countries can be gleaned from the alleged actions
of certain silicone breast implant manufacturers prior to the present controversy. Documents obtained
during discovery allegedly show that some of the breast implant manufacturers were sending defective or
substandard products to some foreign countries. According to the Foreign Plaintiffs' Subcommittee, a
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their opposition, the court, at the end of the settlement opinion, excluded
women from Quebec, Ontario and Australia.7 In order to understand the
implications of this decision, it is important to understand the background
of breast implants and the recent breast implant litigation.
Dow Coming Corporation introduced silicone gel-filled breast
implants 8 into the market in the early 1960s.9 Women immediately began
utilizing the implants to correct congenital defects, remedy unsuccessful
breast reduction surgery, and for reconstruction after surgery for breast can-
cer.10  The implants were also used for cosmetic augmentation."l It is
unclear exactly how many women have received the implants; estimates
range from 1 million to as many as 2.2 million women. 12
Beginning in the early 1990s, scientific testimony was presented at
Congressional and Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") hearings, advis-
ing that "all breast implants slowly degrade during residence in the body
and produce a risk of rupture that increases with time." 13 On January 6,
1979 Bristol-Meyer memorandum indicated that the company had 140 gel-filled mammaries which had
"incomplete adhesion of the gel to the shell." Memorandum of Law of Foreign Plaintiffs' Sub-Committee
of Plaintiffs' Steering Committee in Opposition to Proposed Settlement, at 12 (on file with author); Lindsey
Opinion, supra note 1. The memorandum allegedly included handwritten notes stating: "These units* can
be packaged for shipments to any country other than USA, Western Europe, Australia & New Zealand.
They are excellent for So. Am., Near East, Eastern Europe, Africa, and the Far East." Id (emphasis in
original).
The Foreign Plaintiffs' Subcommittee also claimed that selling defective or inferior products was
also considered by another manufacturer, McGhan. They alleged that a company document, dated October
22, 1977, stated: "[p]roduct deviates from specifications due to visible flaws. Request approval to release
product for shipment to Mexico." Id. at 13 (quoting from Shainwald Affidavit, 16). This document was
allegedly signed by the Quality Assurance Manager, Product Director and Production Manager at McGhan.
Id.
7 Lindsey Opinion, supra note I, at * 14-15. The court did state that although claimants from those
areas were excluded, if individual claimants wanted to affirmatively include themselves in the settlement,
they could do so. However, to the extent that the court eliminated those claimants, the right of re-entry was
conditioned by their agreement to waive any objections and to accept the general terms of the settlement.
Id. at *21-22 (Final Order, 2(b)(2)(B)(i)) (emphasis added).
8 Silicone gel-filled breast implants are the most common type of implant. They consist of a
smooth or textured silicone rubber envelope filled with silicone gel. Jorge S~inchez-Guerrero, et al.,
Silicone Breast Implants and Rheumatic Disease, Clinical, Immunology, and Epidemiologic Studies, 3
ARTHRITIS & RHEUMATISM 158, 159 n.2 (1994).
9 Roman M. Silberfeld, Identifying the Proper Defendant in Implant Cases, MED. LEGAL ASPECTS
OF BREAST IMPLANTS, Oct. 1993, at S-I.
10 SAnchez-Guerrero, supra note 8, at 158-59.
11 Id. at 159.
12 Id. at 158; see also Response of Settlement Class Counsel to Comments and Objections To the
Proposed Settlement, at II (on file with author) [hereinafter Class Counsel Response], Lindsey Opinion,
sipra note 1.
13 Dr. Norman D. Anderson & Wendie A. Berg, Recent Advances for Detecting Failed Implants,
MED. LEGAL ASPECTS OF BREAST IMPLANTS, June 1993, at 4.
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1992, the FDA requested a temporary ban on the use of silicone breast
implants. 14 Included in the material which prompted the moratorium was
an internal memorandum from Dow Coming staff indicating concern about
breast implants. 15 Some of the concerns expressed in the memorandum
included "inadequate quality control specifications; animal studies showing
that silicone components evoked immune reactions in rats; data on
"bleeding" of silicone through the intact elastomer; reports of implant
rupture; and reports of systemic disease in implant recipients."16
While it is true that the history of breast implant litigation began more
than fifteen years ago, 17 it was not until 1992 that the litigation facing
manufacturers of silicone breast implants rapidly began to grow.' 8 The
increased scrutiny by the FDA, as well as several favorable plaintiff ver-
dicts, contributed to the increase in litigation. 19 In September 1993, Dow
Coming20 responded by proposing a global settlement to resolve the con-
troversy.2 1 After a year of negotiations, the court approved the global
settlement agreement.
22
Although the Lindsey Opinion resulted in inequitable treatment of all
foreign breast implant recipients, this Comment focuses primarily on the
problems injured women from Australia, Ontario and Quebec suffered as a
14 E.g., Bendall et al. v. McGhan Medical Corp. et al., 14 O.R.3d 734 (Can. 1993). On January 8,
1992, the Department of National Health and Welfare in Canada similarly declared a moratorium on the
distribution of silicone gel-filled implants. Id. at 735.
15 Bendall, 14 O.R.3d at 735.
16 Id.
17 Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at *3.
18 Leslie J. Bryan, How the PSC Came to Play Pivotal Role in Implant Cases, MED. LEGAL ASPECTS
OF BREAST IMPLANTS, Oct. 1993, at 4. Included in the various lawsuits filed in early 1992 was a class
action, Dante v. Dow Coming Corp., Civil Action File No C-I-92-057 (S.D. Ohio 1992). A controversy
surrounding Dante led to an order by a multidistrict panel of federal judges, directing consolidation of all
federal breast implant cases before the U.S. District Judge Sam C. Pointer of the Northern District of
Alabama. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation, 793 F. Supp. 1098 (Jud. Pan.
Mult. Lit. 1992).
19 Bryan, supra note 18, at 4.
20 Dow Coming was one of the largest manufacturers of breast implants. See generally Lindsey
Opinion, supra note 1, at *20, *21; see also Memorandum of Law of the Government of Canada as
Amicus Curiae in Connection with the Proposed Settlement, at 9-10 n.5 (citing Dow Coming's Form 10K
for the fiscal year ending December 31, 1988) (on file with author) [hereinafter Government of Canada],
Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1.
2 Bryan, supra note 18, at 4.
22 Lindsey Opinion, supra note I, at *3. Other settling defendants included: Baxter Healthcare
Corp., Baxter International, Inc., Medical Engineering Corp. Bristol-Myers Squire Co., Minnesota Mining
& Manufacturing Co., Applied Silicone Corp., Wilshire Technologies, Inc., Union Carbide Corp., and
McGhan Medical Corp. Id. at *21.
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result of the court's decision.23 This focus is predominantly due to the
availability of information about breast implant recipients from Australia,
Ontario and Quebec.
24
Part II of this Comment discusses the procedural background of the
settlement agreement. Part III briefly outlines the purpose and need for
class actions in an expanding products liability market. Part IV outlines the
class action procedural requirements necessary for the discussion of this
settlement. Part V discusses the procedural errors in the opinion and the
resulting difficulties facing women in Australia, Ontario and Quebec.
Finally, Part VI offers a brief solution the court could have adopted to
resolve the problems for those women.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF THE SETTLEMENT OPINION
In April 1994, Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr., of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama provisionally certified In Re:
Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation, Heidi Lindsey, et
al., v. Dow Corning Corp., et al.,25 under Federal Civil Procedure Rule
23(b)(3), as a class action 26 for settlement purposes. 27 This certification
included preliminary and conditional approval to a proposed
$4,225,070,000 settlement amount.
28
A. Procedural Requirements to Participate in the Settlement
The settlement agreement was intended to resolve the increasing
controversy resulting from thousands of silicone breast implant lawsuits
23 Although this was purported to be a global class action breast implant settlement agreement,
women from those areas were excluded from the settlement. Id. at * 15.
24 The availability of information about women from Australia, Ontario and Quebec likely resulted
because of the aggressive legal representation those women received prior to the settlement approval, as
well as the fact that large number of women from those areas were breast implant recipients.
25 Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at *3.
26 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3), one possible form for filing a class action lawsuit, requires that the court
find that the questions of law or fact common to the class predominate over any questions affecting indi-
vidual members, and further the court must determine that a class action suit is superior to other available
methods for "fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Id.
27 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) provides for the settlement of class actions, but only if the settlement agree-
ment is approved by the court. See 7B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1797 n.4, (1986).
28 Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at *3.
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pending in the United States and abroad.29 According to the Lindsey
Opinion, detailed information concerning the settlement was sent by first-
class mail to each person identified as a possible breast implant recipient,
both. foreign30 and domestic. 31 This notice included all of the items required
under Rule 23(c)(2), 32 as well as a form for requesting exclusion from the
class. 3
3
Recipients of the settlement notice packages had several options.
First, to be guaranteed compensation, women needed to register in the
class. 34 Initial registration in the class was intended to provide immediate
benefits to claimants at the conclusion of settlement approval. 35 Foreign
women were required to send the registration form by December 1, 1994, or
they lost all benefits under the settlement.36 In contrast, domestic class
members who did not file at the specified time still retained the right to
benefits, although the early registrants received first priority and considera-
tion.37 Second, class members had the choice to opt out of the class,
38
preserving their right to individually sue in a U.S. court.39 Finally, domestic
claimants could do nothing, thereby remaining in the settlement, regardless
29 Id. at *3.
30 Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, "Foreign Claimants" were identified as those class
members who, as of April 1, 1994, were neither citizens nor permanent resident aliens of the United States
and whose breast implants were done outside of the United States. See Breast Implant Litigation
Settlement Agreement at 31 (on file with author) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement], Lindsey Opinion,
supra note 1.
31 The Settlement Agreement used the term "domestic" claimants to refer to all class members not
defined as "Foreign Claimants." Lindsey Opinion, supra note I, at *3 n. 1.
32 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) states that 23(b)(3) class actions require the court to "direct the members
of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members
who can be identified through reasonable effort." In addition, the notice must "advise each member that
(A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment,
whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who
does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel." Id.
33 Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at *3.
34 Id. at *6.
35 Id. at *5. However, no benefits can be distributed to class members until any appeals are
resolved. Currently, there are numerous class members appealing the settlement, including women from
both Australia and Canada. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation, ANDREWS
BREAST IMPLANT LmGATION REPORTER (Nat. Journal of Breast Implant Lit.), Oct. 28, 1994, at 4432.
36 Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at * 10.
3 7 
Id.
38 The right to "opt out" of a settlement class is designed to protect absent dissident class members
by allowing them to exclude themselves from a settlement that the court may find is fair, adequate, and
reasonable despite objections by those protesting the settlement. See 2 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA
CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.28 (1992).
39 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A). Foreign claimants who chose to opt out preserved their right to
sue in both U.S. courts or the courts of their country. Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at * 13.
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of the outcome. 40 This would possibly entitle them to compensation if they
should later develop injuries or diseases, and the fund still had compensa-
tion available. 4 1 The court made note of the fact that foreign women
retained the "right" to proceed in courts of their own country if they missed
the deadline to register or to opt out.42
B. Foreign Women Were Treated Inequitably Under the Agreement
Although the settlement agreement has been controversial, the court
stated that generally, domestic women favored the settlement.43 However,
the court acknowledged that virtually all foreign women who submitted
comments to the court felt the settlement inequitably treated foreign claim-
ants relative to domestic claimants.44  Most foreign class members
requested that the court use its powers to "reduce perceived inequities
between foreign and domestic members." 45 The court contended that
foreign class members were not requesting rejection of the entire settlement,
but rather that the settlement amount be distributed equitably. 46
Opposition to the settlement was most significant among putative
class members from Australia and Canada.47 Women from those countries
submitted numerous letters and memoranda to the court criticizing the
disparate allocation of the settlement fund.48 In fact, at the time of the
settlement opinion, almost eighty percent of foreign class members opting
out of the settlement were from Australia, Quebec and Ontario. 49
40 See Settlement Agreement supra note 30, at 12.
41 Seeid. at21.
42 Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at *6. This was one of the solutions the court suggested for foreign
women if they did not receive notice of the settlement. Id. at *6.
43 Id.
44Id.
45 Id. (emphasis added).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at *6, * I.
49 Id. at * 14.
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C. The Objections Expressed by Foreign Class Members
1. The Notice to Foreign Women Was Inadequate.
Foreign women objected to the settlement for several reasons. First,
the notice given to foreign claimants was less than that given to domestic
claimants.5 0 Foreign claimants argued that it did not meet the requirements
for notice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 1 The court stated
that over 380,000 notice packages were mailed to potential claimants before
September 1, the date the settlement was approved.5 2 Many of those
claimants, were identified by what the court termed a "Claimant-
Identification Program," which provided, in part, abbreviated information
about the settlement.5 3 This program, which was administrated at a cost of
over $2 million, was used for advertising in the United States. The infor-
mation appeared in newspapers, magazines and on television. The program
further included distribution of audio tapes for radio transmission in the
United States.5 4 However, the program did not provide for similar adver-
tisements outside the United States. 55
Sources in Australia estimated that between 80,000 to 100,000
Australian women received breast implants.5 6 Canada estimated between
80,000 to 120,000 women received the implants. 57 In addition, foreign
50 Id. at "5.
51 Id. at *l i. In addition to the minimal actual notice sent to non-U.S. claimants, notice outside the
United States apparently consisted of press conferences and press releases, directed to world-wide media,
as well as press kits sent to media in 24 foreign countries. The court noted that claimants from over 65
countries had participated or excluded themselves from the settlement. Id. at *5. It seems objectionable
that press kits were only sent to media in 24 foreign countries if the court is aware of claimants in at least
65 countries.
52 Id. at *4.
53 Id. at *5.
54 Id.
55 Id The court further stated that because foreign women would still have the right to sue in the
courts of their own countries [a fundamental sovereign right that the United States has no control over],
there is a strong argument that a "claimant-identification program" would not have been required outside
the United States. Id. at *13. This seems extremely unjust given the fact that the plaintiffs' class purport-
edly includes foreign claimants.
56 See Australian Objectors in Response to Plaintiffs' Opening Memorandum in Support of Approval
of Class Settlement and Opening Memorandum for Certain Settlement Defendants in Support of Final
Approval of Breast Implant Settlement Agreement at 156; (Open Letter from Breast Implant Resource
Service (Australia) to The Honorable Sam C. Pointer, Jr. (June 2, 1994)) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Australian Objectors], Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1.
57 Government of Canada, supra note 20, at 6. The Canadian government stated that their estimate
was based on information gathered by the Health Protection Branch of Health Canada from the breast
implant industry and the Provinces of Health Department. Id. at 6.
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class members claimed that Dow Coming acknowledged receiving $68
million from the overseas sales of at least 579,000 breast implants. 58
However, the Plaintiffs' Class Counsel conceded that only 5,894 of the
notice packages were sent to non-U.S. residents.59
2. The Representation for Foreign Women was Inadequate.
In addition to inadequate notice, foreign claimants raised several
important objections to the representation of foreign class members. First,
although the pleadings named seven plaintiffs, none were foreign women.
60
Further, none of the attorneys on the Plaintiffs' Negotiating Committee
represented foreign class members. 6 1 Many foreign class members argued
that these two factors indicated they were not adequately represented in the
settlement. 62  Finally, foreign claimants' participation in the proposed
settlement was initiated by a defendant rather than the Plaintiffs'
Negotiating Committee.63 Many foreign women, particularly those from
Australia and Canada, felt the Plaintiffs' Negotiating Counsel did not advo-
cate their position.64
3. The Settlement Allocation Was Unfair to Foreign Class Members
Finally, the primary and fundamental objection by foreign class
members related to the disparity in potential benefits afforded foreign
claimants as opposed to domestic claimants. 65 This included a three percent
58 Objections of Diane Matheson, Catherine McNeil and Barbara Living, On Their Own Behalf and
On Behalf of the Putative Subclass of Foreign Claimants, to Provisional Class Certification and Final
Settlement Approval, at 5 n. I (on file with author), Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1.
59 See Class Counsel Response, supra note 12, at 35.
60 Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at * 11.
61 The court determined that "the lack of foreign claimants from the list of named Plaintiffs or from
those who were clients of counsel on the Plaintiffs' Negotiating Committee is not necessarily fatal to certi-
fication of the class and approval of the settlement, even in the face of differences in treatment under the
settlement." Id. at '14.
62 Australian Objectors, supra note 56, at 11. Foreign claimants argued that the resulting disparity in
the settlement amount between the domestic and foreign claimants was further reflected by the fact that
there was an absence of direct participation in the negotiating process by representatives of foreign claim-
ants. See Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at * 11.
63 Id. at *11.
64 See Australian Objectors, supra note 56, at 11; see also Government of Canada, supra note 20, at
12.
65 Lindsey Opinion, supra note I, at * 11.
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cap under the settlement Disease Compensation Program 66 for money to go
to foreign claimants, while the remainder of the $4.2 billion settlement was
designated for domestic claimants. 67 The negotiating parties acknowl-
edged,68 and the settlement opinion reflects, that the three percent cap was
not based on empirical data, but instead on "pragmatic" considerations.
69
The court explained:
[i]n short, recognizing that a total of [$2.7 billion] would be
paid into the [Disease Compensation] Program, how much of
this should be set aside for foreign claimants to enable offers of
settlement that would be acceptable to many of them, while not
so depleting the funds available for domestic claimants as to
make the settlement offer unacceptable to too many of them?
The 3% figure was ultimately viewed by the parties as not so
large as to result in offers of settlement unacceptable to too
many domestic claimants.
70
D. The Court's Justificationsfor Settlement Approval
In the settlement opinion, the court's primary justifications for
66 The "Disease Compensation Program" is defined in the settlement agreement as the program
under which claimants who satisfy the diagnostic criteria set forth in the Disease Definitions of the agree-
ment are entitled to receive payment for those Diseases. Settlement Agreement, supra note 30, at 17. This
program is the primary source of compensation for claimants, both foreign and domestic. See id., Exhibit
F.
67 Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at * I.
68 The Plaintiffs' Settlement Counsel, in their Class Counsel Response, stated:
The potentially disparate treatment of domestic and foreign claimants is predicated upon sound
practical and policy reasons. The Court approved Notice states: 'Claims in the United States
Courts by [foreign Claimants] are subject to strong and unique procedural and substantive
defenses. Many foreign Claimants have national health and medical care programs that pay
costs or diagnoses and treatment and either do not have access to indigenous tort systems or are
significantly limited, in comparison with United States Claimants, in the compensation they may
recover.' This is, in part, the rationale behind the 3% cap ....
Class Counsel Response, supra note 12, at 34-35 (emphasis in original), Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1.
69 Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at * 13.
70 Id. (emphasis added).
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approving the disparities in the settlement included:
(1) [P]rovisions were included in the settlement to afford
all registering foreign class members a guaranteed second right
to opt out after the amounts payable to foreign claimants under
the Current Disease Compensation Program were determined ...
[which would assure foreign claimants] rights to pursue claims
in their own country, but also whatever rights they might
have-with benefit of a suspension of statutes of limitation-to
pursue litigation in the United States... ;71 and
(2) [t]he settlement value of tort claims that can be
pursued in federal or state courts in the United States is gen-
erally greater than the settlement value of such claims if
pursued in judicial and administrative tribunals in at least most
other countries .... 72
Despite the strong objections by Australian and Canadian women, as
well as other foreign class members, on September 1, 1994, the settlement
was approved. 7
3
E. The Exclusion of Women from Australia, Quebec and Ontario
The court modified the Lindsey agreement before approving the
settlement.74 This included a redefinition of the class by excluding foreign
claimants from Australia and the Canadian provinces of Ontario and
Quebec.75 The court noted that almost eighty percent of the foreign women
opting out of the breast implant settlement were from Australia and the
Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec. 76
71 Id. at * 12-13. The court added that in order for the foreign claimants to sue in U.S. courts, they
would have to overcome defendants' arguments based on the doctrine offoruma non conveniens as well as
potential choice-of-law problems. Id. at * 12.
72 Id. at * 12. According to the negotiating parties and the court, this included the differences in
"standards and procedures for offering expert testimony, the actions and findings of governmental regula-
tory bodies with respect to breast implants, and the extent of governmentally supported healthcare
systems." Id. at "12.
73 Id. at '3.
74 Id. at * 14.
75 Id
76 Id.
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The court justified excluding claimants from Australia, Ontario and
Quebec by applying the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 77 Rule 23(b)(3),78 states that maintenance of a class action
under this rule is conditioned upon a determination that "a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of
the controversy." 79 Factors pertinent to a finding of superiority include:
"(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions," and "(B) the extent and nature
of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class." 80  The court maintained that these two
criteria were not met with respect to potential class members from Australia,
Quebec and Ontario and therefore warranted their exclusion. 8 1 In order to
understand the injustice of excluding class members from Australia, Ontario
and Quebec, it is necessary to discuss the function of a class action in a
product liability context.
III. THE PURPOSE OF CLASS ACTIONS
"The class action was an invention of equity . . mothered by the
practical necessity of providing a procedural device so that mere numbers
would not disable large groups of individuals, united in interest, from
enforcing their equitable rights nor grant them immunity from their equita-
ble wrongs." 82 In 1938, with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, class actions became available in actions for legal relief as well
as actions historically equitable. 83
The history of mass tort class actions has been greatly disputed, but
the recent phenomenon of nationwide or worldwide products liability cases
congesting the U.S. courts has created increased pressure upon both state
and federal courts to utilize class actions. 84  Although management
77 Id. at *15.
78 This class action was certified as a 23(b)(3) class action. See Lindsey Opinion, supra note I, at
*3.
79 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3).
80 Id.
81 Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at * 15.
82 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 1751 (quoting Montgomery Ward and Co. v. Langer, 168
F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948)).
83 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 1752.
84 7B WRIGHT El AL., supra note 27, § 1805.
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difficulties are often raised as a bar to class litigation,8
5 when a potential
class has thousands 86 or even millions 87 of claimants, courts need to utilize
a class action to avoid unmanageable court congestion.88 It is in these
situations where the traditional alternatives, such as joinder, consolidation,
and intervention are impracticable.
89
Currently, class action lawsuits are used to relieve individuals from
the burden and expense of separate legal actions when the underlying claim
is shared by hundreds or thousands of other claimants.
90 Class action suits
provide for expeditious handling of mass product liability disputes.
91
Consolidation of the claims give individuals with fewer resources who have
been harmed or injured a feasible opportunity for redressing their injuries.
92
Breast implant litigation has increased dramatically in the United
States in the last two years. 93 Women throughout the world have been
85 This defense is usually raised by the defendants as a bar to certification of a class action. I
NEWBERG, supra note 38, § 4.33.
86 "Decisions upholding classes with several thousand members are common." Id. § 4.33 (citing
Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 86 FRD 476 (D. Vt. 1980), where a class of 3,150 were certified under
Rule 23(b)(3) in an environmental action).
87 1 NEWBERG supra note 38, § 4.33 (citing Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance-United Expressways,
494 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1974), where a class of over I million members was allowed).
88 1 NEWBERG, supra note 38, § 4.33.
89 Id. Professor Newberg cites to Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, a case involving library book
price fixing, where the District Court of Illinois discussed the resulting problems stemming from the initial
class denial of a potentially large class:
The extensive litigation already commenced illustrates the wide-spread, but diffuse nature of the
injury inflicted upon the public libraries and schools. Recognizing the desirability of concentrat-
ing this interwoven, far-flung litigation in a single forum, the Judicial Panel transferred all cases
to this Court for consolidated pretrial proceedings. Intensifying the concentration, class actions
will promote desirable economies of time, effort and expense. For example, plaintiffs will no
longer need to file new lawsuits, most of which would eventually be transferred here anyway.
In response, defendants suggest that permissive intervention and joinder is preferable. The
recent history of this litigation dramatically illustrates the impracticability of these alternatives.
In 1966 there was a single suit purporting to be a class action. The entire litigation might have
been concluded without further complexity. But defendants successfully opposed the class suit,
with the result that lawsuits have blossomed throughout the country. Rather than the original
handful of attorneys, lawyers are now so plentiful that the entire courtroom is filled at each
pretrial conference. Section 1407 consolidation became mandatory. When returned for trial, the
subsequently filed cases will consume substantial amounts of the transferor courts' time. The
prospect of further intervention and joinder, combined with the inevitable proliferation of law-
suits, is inimical to economical adjudication.
I NEWBERG, supra note 38, § 4.33 (quoting Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp.
484,489-90 (ND Ill. 1969)). '
90 See 7B WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 27, § 1783.
91 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 1805.
92 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 1754.
93 Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at *3.
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facing both physical and emotional injuries as a result of silicone
implants.94  Further, medical reports regarding the danger of silicone
implants 95 have added to the dramatic increase of breast implant litigation.96
The attempt to settle these claims resulted in the filing of Lindsey as a class
for settlement purposes.97 The court stated that when proposing a settle-
ment in the face of the uncertainties of individual litigation, the parties
recognized:
(1) the defendants' resources are not unlimited, and would be
reduced, to the potential detriment of claimants, by huge costs
incurred in litigation over the coming years; (2) thousands of
claimants cannot afford to wait their turn in the judicial queues;
and (3) the federal and state court systems will not be able to
resolve promptly all breast implant cases without a substantial
reduction in the number of cases now pending or expected. 98
The possibility of a successful breast implant class action would
remedy these dangers. First, it would relieve both domestic and foreign
claimants from the burden and expense of separate legal actions. It poten-
tially provides for expeditious handling of breast implant disputes.
Additionally, a class action for breast implant settlement gives claimants
with fewer resources, but who have been injured by the implants, an oppor-
tunity to receive compensation for their injury. Finally, a successful breast
implant class action would provide a "cap" on defendants' liability.
IV. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Requirements Necessary to Certify a Class Action
Several requirements exist in order to certify a class action. First,
although not specifically mentioned in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
94 See, e.g., Bendall et al. v. McGhan Medical Corp. et al., 14 O.R.3d 734 (Can. 1993).
95 Id. at 736.
96 Bryan, supra note 18, at 4.
97 See Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at *3.
98 Id at *4.
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courts have determined there must be a "class." 99 In addition, the named
representative parties must be members of the class they are representing.100
These two requirements were not an issue in the Lindsey Opinion.
Rule 23(a) then expressly sets forth four factors that must exist before
the class can be certified. 1 1 Rule 23(a) states:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as repre-
sentative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.102
The first three requirements of this rule were not an issue in the Lindsey
Opinion. However, the court erred when applying the fourth prerequisite
for certification of this class action.
103
B. The Role of the Court in Maintenance of a 23(b)(3) Class Action
The Lindsey breast implant class action was certified as a Rule
23(b)(3) action for settlement purposes. 1' 4 According to the requirements
of Rule 23(b)(3), the court must ensure the settlement is fair and adequate as
a class, which will facilitate resolution of the class controversy.105 The role
the district courts play in determining whether a class action should be
maintained and what the definition of the class will be requires a weighing
of four factors listed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).1
06 The
Rule states:
99 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 1760. Existence of a class is a question of fact determined
by the circumstances of each case. However, every potential member of the class does not have to be
ascertainable to certify the class. 
Id.
100 See Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33 (1962).
101 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
102 Id.
103 See discussion infra at part V.
104 Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at *3.
105 2 NEWBERG, supra note 38, § 11.28.
106 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 1780.
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An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequi-
sites of subdivision (a) [FRCP 23(a)] are satisfied, and in
addition: ... (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent
to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the
class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or against
members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the man-
agement of a class action.107
While the last two factors were not at issue in the Lindsey Opinion, the court
in Lindsey incorrectly determined that (A) and (B), were not meti0 8 and
thereby justified exclusion of class members from Australia, Ontario, and
Quebec on those grounds.109
V. THE COURT ERRED WHEN APPLYING CLASS ACTION REQUIREMENTS
Rule 23 should be liberally construed to achieve its objectives.ll0
The court has the continuing duty to guarantee that a settlement agreement
meets the requirements of the Rule, ensuring that the settlement is fair and
adequate. 111 In Lindsey, the court did not ensure that foreign women were
afforded adequate representation, which subsequently led to the disparate
settlement allocation and the exclusion of claimants from Australia, Quebec
and Ontario.
Although the Lindsey court did not explicitly state that due process
requirements need not be met for foreign claimants, the court's justification
107 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(bX3).
108 See discussion infra at Part V.
109 Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at * 15.
110 See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 563. (2d Cir. 1968) (dismissing "a
particular proceeding as not a proper class action is justified only by a clear showing to that effect and after
a proper appraisal of all the factors enumerated on the face of the rule itself.").
111 3 NEWBERG, supra note 38, § 16.25 (emphasis added).
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for the settlement disparity suggested that effect. 12 The class defendants
expressly argued that foreign class members should not and are not entitled
to due process rights."l 3 However, by certifying a "global" class, the
Lindsey court brought foreign women within the jurisdiction of the United
States for purposes of the breast implant settlement. In Lindsey, the class
was defined as:
All persons and entities wherever located, who have or may in
the future have any claim (whether filed or unfiled, existing or
contingent, and specifically including claims for injuries or
damages not yet known or manifest), including assigned claims
in any state or federal courts of the United States or the courts
of its territories or possessions, against any of the Defendants
and/or Released Parties arising out of, based upon, related to or
involving Breast Implants or Breast Implant Materials manu-
factured prior to June 1, 1993 .... 114
In addition, in another global class action, In Re Agent Orange
Product Liability Litigation,115 that court afforded due process rights to
Australian and New Zealand plaintiffs by ensuring that they received
adequate representation and equal compensation. 116 The Lindsey court had
the same responsibility to foreign women in this class action.
A. Foreign Class Members Did Not Have Adequate Representation
Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the parties. 117 The courts have deter-
mined that adequate representation requires that the representative parties
112 See Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at * 12-13; see also Memorandum of Settling Defendants in
Response to Certain Objections and in Further Support of Approval of Settlement, at 47 (on file with
author), Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1.
113 Memorandum of Settling Defendants in Response to Certain Objections and in Further Support
of Approval of Settlement, at 47 (on file with author), Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1.
114 Settlement Agreement, supra note 30, at 10 (emphasis added).
115 611 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd in relevant part, reversed in part, 818 F.2d 179 (2d
Cir. 1987).
116 Id. at 1443-1445 (In a worldwide settlement of Agent Orange claims, Vietnam veterans from
Australia and New Zealand were found to constitute up to 2% of the total population of Vietnam veterans.
They were therefore allocated 2% of the settlement fund.). Cf. Vancouver Women's Health Collective
Society v. A.H. Robins Co., 820 F.2d 1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1987).
117 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
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themselves must be adequate l 8 and the attorneys representing the class
must be adequate. 119 This prerequisite, essential to meet due process stan-
dards, must be satisfied at all stages of the process.120 The court in Lindsey
determined that although no attorneys on the Plaintiffs' Negotiating
Committee represented foreign claimants, it was not "fatal to certification of
the class and approval of the settlement, even in the face of differences in
treatment under the settlement."121 The court based this conclusion on the
justifications that tort damage awards in most foreign countries are not
equal to awards in the United States, and further that foreign claimants were
afforded a second right to opt out, thereby allowing them to file suit in the
United States or in their own country.
12 2
For settlement purposes, the adequate representation requirement is
satisfied when the court determines that "the settlement was negotiated at
arm's length and was not collusive in favoring the class representative at the
expense of the class."'1
23
If the settlement process meets this criteria, courts presume that class
interests have been adequately represented in the negotiation, and the
settlement should be approved if the court determines the settlement is fair
and adequate for resolution of the class controversy. 124 In the Lindsey
opinion, although the court did not approve a settlement amount that
favored the class representatives over all absentee members of the class, the
court did approve a settlement amount that allocated only three percent of
the $4.2 billion dollars to all foreign claimants, with the rest reserved for
118 See. e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940).
119 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562-563 (2nd Cir. 1968) (requiring the class
attorne, to be "qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation.").
0 In re General Motors Corp Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979) (holding that the trial court has a "continuing duty to undertake stringent
examination of adequacy of representation by the named class representatives and their counsel at all
stages of the litigation.") (emphasis added).
121 See Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at * II.
122 at *13.
123 2 NEWBERG, supra note 38, § 11.28; see also In re A.H. Robins Co. (Breland v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co.), 85 B.R. 373 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) ("The primary issue which the Court must ultimately
determine in a settlement context is whether the class's claims were fairly and vigorously advocated in
non-collusive negotiations reaching a fair and reasonable settlement.").
124 2 NEWBERG, supra note 38, § 11.28; (citing Rogers v. Etowah County, 717 F. Supp. 778 (N.D.
Ala. 1989), requiring the settlement proposal to be fair, adequate and reasonable and not the product of
fraud and collusion between the parties prior to court approval).
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domestic claimants.125 This was based on what the judge admitted was an
arbitrary determination.126
The court should use a strict standard when reviewing the allocation
of disparate settlement funds between plaintiff classes. 127 To determine
whether the court should approve a class action settlement, the court must
recognize that different class members may have diverging interests, and
should therefore examine whether some of those interests are unjustly
compromised.128 When a settlement expressly favors certain plaintiffs, "a
substantial burden falls upon proponents of the settlement to demonstrate
and document its fairness." 129
In Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 130 the Eleventh Circuit considered
a class action settlement agreement in an employment discrimination con-
troversy between the Continental Can Company and the Steel Workers of
America. The method of distribution adopted by the class representatives
allocated approximately one-half of the settlement funds to the eight named
representative plaintiffs. The remainder of the fund was to be allocated to
the remaining 118 members of the class. 131 When reviewing the fairness
and adequacy of the settlement proposal, the court stated:
The court should not allow a majority, no matter how large, to
impose its decision on the minority. In such circumstances,
objection by a few dissatisfied class members should trigger
close judicial scrutiny to ensure that the burden of settlement is
not shifted arbitrarily to a small group of class members. We
agree that 'where representative plaintiffs obtain more for
themselves by settlement than they do for the class for whom
they are obligated to act as fiduciaries, serious questions are
raised as to the fairness of the settlement to the class.'1 32
125 Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at * 13.
126 The Court acknowledged that the 3% cap placed on the amount of money to go to foreign
claimants was an arbitrary number, finding no support from empirical data. Id.
127 See generally In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation American Poultry, 669 F.2d 228 (C.A. Ga.
1112)i28 Reynolds v. King, 790 F. Supp. 1101, 1105 (M.D. Ala. 1990).
129 Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1147 (11 th Cir. 1983).
130 Id.
131 Id. at 1146.
132 Id. at 1148, quoting Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 91 F.R.D. 434, 441-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affla
668 F.2d 654 (2nd Cir. 1982).
VOL. 4 No. 2
LINDSEY V DOW CORNING
In Holmes, the objecting class members argued that they received
inadequate representation in the settlement and that the "inadequacy of
representation [was] evidenced by the disparate distribution of the fund and
by class representatives' failure to consider the merits of the objecting
parties' individual claims."133 The court subsequently concluded that the
settlement proponents did not meet their burden of overcoming the facial
unfairness of the allocation of the settlement fund. 134
In Reynolds v. King,135 a case involving a similar class settlement, an
Alabama district court considered a class action settlement agreement chal-
lenging the Alabama Highway Department's alleged discrimination in the
hiring and promotion of African Americans.136 The proposed settlement
was to give the six named representative plaintiffs substantial monetary
benefits, but provided only nominal amounts to other class members. 137
The court applied the rationale of Holmes, holding that in determining
whether to approve settlement in a class action, the "court must recognize
that interests of different class members may diverge."138 Accordingly, the
court must be careful to scrutinize whether certain of those interests are
"wrongfully compromised, betrayed or 'sold out"' 139 under the terms of the
proposed settlement.140 The court then determined that the settlement terms
were inequitable and refused to approve the settlement.141
The Lindsey settlement is similar to the fact situations in both Holmes
and Reynolds. Nevertheless, in Lindsey the court did not find that the rights
of absent foreign class members had been wrongfully compromised. In
Lindsey, although the agreement did not discriminate between the class rep-
resentatives and the absentee members, it did discriminate between
domestic claimants and foreign claimants by placing a three percent cap on
damages allocated to foreign claimants. The disparity in settlement
proceeds created an inherent conflict of interest between domestic claimants
and foreign claimants, thereby making it unfeasible for Plaintiffs' Counsel
to adequately represent foreign women.
133 Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1148.
134 Id. at 1148.
135 Reynolds v. King, 790 F. Supp. 1101 (M.D. Ala. 1990).
136 Id. at 1102.
137 Id. at 1104.
138 Id. at 1108.
139 Id. at 1108, (quoting Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1169 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979)).
140 Reynolds, 790 F. Supp. at 1108.
141 Id. at 1114.
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The Plaintiffs' Negotiating Counsel and the court justified these
discrepancies based on claims that foreign claimants who opted out of the
settlement still retained additional rights to sue in the United States as well
as in their own countries, and finally because damage awards in most
countries are less than damages awarded in the United States. 142 Foreign
claimants, particularly claimants in Quebec, Ontario and Australia,
expressed opposition to this rationale. 143
B. Application of Rule 23(b)(3) Was Incorrect
In response to the intense opposition from Australian and Canadian
claimants, the court made a few changes to the settlement agreement, and
subsequently excluded claimants from Australia, Quebec and Ontario. 144
The court based the exclusion on its finding that Rule 23(b)(3) requirements
were not met. 1
4 5
First, the Lindsey court stated that women from Australia, Quebec and
Ontario did not meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3)(A).1 46 This rule
provides that account must be taken of the interest individual members
might have in controlling their rights in separate lawsuits. 147 Careful
evaluation of the individual interests is important to ensure that injured
parties have an opportunity to have their day in court or have their interests
completely protected by the representative parties. 148 As one authority
suggests, "a strong desire for individual control may often reflect dissatis-
faction with the class representation, both of the counsel and the
representative parties."'149 In Lindsey, claimants from both Australia and the
two Canadian provinces, as well as attorneys representing the government
142 See Lindsey Opinion, supra note I, at * 12.
143 Claimants from both countries submitted memoranda arguing that the tort values in Australia
and Canada are comparable to damage awards in the United States. See Australian Objectors, supra note
56, at 14; see also Government of Canada, supra note 20, at 10.
144 Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at *15.
145 See Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at *15.
146 Id. at * 15.
147 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)
148 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 38, § 1780.
149 Id.
VOL. 4 No. 2
LINDSEY V. DOW CORNING
of Canada, submitted briefs and letters to the courtl 50 declaring their dissat-
isfaction with the class representation for foreign class members. 15'
In addition, the court determined that Rule 23(b)(3)(B) further justi-
fied exclusion of women from Australia, Ontario and Quebec. 152 Rule
23(b)(3)(B) requires a determination of whether class actions are appropri-
ate based on whether litigation already commenced by class members is
excessive and related in nature to the current controversy. 153 The court
found it significant that there were breast implant casespending in courts in
Australia and Canada.' 54 Further, the court noted that both countries permit
class actions comparable to Federal Rule 23, and that both countries were
either contemplating class actions or had already filed such actions in their
own countries. 155 This seems less significant given the fact that the court
previously acknowledged that almost 10,000 breast implant cases were
pending in federal courts in the United States, with almost as many in the
state courts. 156 The court did not explain why the fact that breast implant
cases are pending in Australia and the two Canadian provinces is a reason to
exclude those claimants, since thousands of breast implant cases by domes-
tic women were similarly pending in U.S. courts before the Lindsey
settlement was certified.
Finally, Rule 23(b)(3)(B) is meant to ensure judicial efficiency and to
reduce the likelihood of multiple claims. 157 Excluding claimants from
Australia, Canada and Quebec, rather than guaranteeing their fair treatment,
has done little to ensure judicial efficiency and reduce the possibility of
multiple claims. Thousands of claimants from both countries have now
filed individual lawsuits in the United States.'
58
150 See generally Australian Objectors, supra note 56; see also Government of Canada, supra note
20, at 12.
151 Many of the objections regarding adequate representation of foreign claimants, particularly
claimants in Australia, felt that the lack of representation for women was directly related to the fact that the
total amount of compensation to go to all foreign claimants was only 3%. See generally Australian
Objectors, supra note 56; see also Government of Canada, supra note 20.
152 Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at * 15.
153 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(B).
154 Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at "15.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 4.
157 7A WRIGHT ETAL., supra note 27, § 1780.
158 See Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at "15.
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VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION
If the court determines that the representation is not adequate, possi-
ble solutions include dismissing the action for noncompliance with Rule
23(a)(4),15 9 allowing the proceeding to continue solely for the benefit of the
named parties, or issuing an order establishing subclasses. 160  Rule
23(c)(4)(B) was designed to give courts maximum flexibility and it author-
izes courts to divide the class into appropriate subclasses. 16 1 Courts have
the ability to continuously evaluate and isolate any issues appropriate for
separate representative treatment, and should scrutinize the agreement
throughout the settlement process.162
The creation of subclasses is generally used in class actions where the
interests of certain members of a class are divergent or antagonistic. 163 In
Lindsey, the interests of class members from Australia, Canada and Quebec
were so antagonistic from the interests of the rest of class members that
almost eighty percent of the foreign claimants excluding themselves from
the class were from those two countries.164 They were strongly opposed to
the disparate settlement allocation and to the lack of adequate representa-
tion. 16 5 However, creation of a subclass from Australia, Ontario and
Quebec would have remedied many of the objections by those women. This
would have allowed the counsel who were already advocating the position
of those women to participate in the Plaintiffs' Negotiating Committee. 166
159 In cases when adequacy is raised at the outset of the action, the court need not dismiss the
action on grounds of inadequate representation, but rather is authorized to remedy the problem, possibly by
creating subclasses. See 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 1790.
I See Rental Car of New Hampshire, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 496 F. Supp. 373 (D.C.
Mass. 1980) (where the court held that a conflict of interest must jeopardize the interests of the class mem-
bers to justify class denial, and that conflict should not preclude class certification when the interests of the
absentees can be protected by the creation of subclasses...
161 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra, note 27, § 1790.
162 Id.
163 Id; see also Mendoza v. U.S., 623 F.2d 1338, (9th Cir, 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 1351, 450
U.S. 912, 67 L.Ed.2d 336 (holding that it is appropriate to create subclasses when there are divergent views
among class members, and that a subclass would materially improve representation of class considera-
tions)i
164 Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at * 14.
165 Id. ,
166 See Australian Objectors, supra note 56, at 11.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Lindsey class action was intended as a global settlement for sili-
cone breast implant recipients. 167 Instead, the settlement allocated disparate
monetary compensation to foreign class members. The strong opposition
by foreign claimants afforded foreign class members no further advantages,
and further resulted in the exclusion of women from Australia, Ontario and
Quebec.
By excluding claimants from Australia, Quebec and Ontario, those
claimants, in order to receive compensation for their physical and emotional
injuries, must now file separate claims. This means either filing suit in their
own countries or in the United States, or initiating a similar class action in
their own countries. The court, in Lindsey, acknowledged that filing
individual lawsuits was risky given that the defendants' resources are not
unlimited and would further be reduced by the tremendous costs of
individual litigation.168 Further, the court acknowledged that claimants,
numbering in the thousands, cannot afford to wait until the judicial queues
can process their individual claims.169 These same problems seem to apply
even if women from Australia or the two Canadian provinces choose to
initiate class actions in their own countries. If the resources allocated to this
settlement agreement are distributed to all other claimants in the Lindsey
action, it will limit the available resources for either class actions in Canada
and Australia, or individual lawsuits filed by claimants in those two coun-
tries. Therefore, rather than uphold the settlement with the disparities and
exclude women from Australia, Ontario, and Quebec, the court should have
created a subclass of women from Australia and the two Canadian prov-
inces.
167 See Lindsey Opinion, supra note 1, at *3.
168 Id. at *4.
169 Id.
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